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This paper examines the imitation of models in the Polish transition. The 
reconstruction of an economic and political order in 1989 has widely been 
interpreted as the imitation of capitalism and democracy. This paper 
conceives of imitation as aiming to overcome the distance to a desired model. 
By applying Bruno Latour’s concept of action at a distance, it is argued that 
institutions and practices of capitalism and democracy were not the principal 
models of imitation in the Polish transition. Essentially, Poland wanted to 
shorten the distance to model-like ‘islands’ in the West and in its own past. 
Rather than to Team’ capitalism or democracy as of 1989, Poland sought 























































































































































































I. 1989: East Meets West
Taking the case of Poland, this paper is concerned with the imitation of 
distant models during the breaking point of 1989. Imitation has been widely 
recognised as one, perhaps the most important, mechanism in post-communist 
countries to reorganise the social and political order.1 In this vein, the West 
has been widely considered to be the provider of models for the rebuilding of 
order in Eastern Europe. In an essay written in 1983, i.e. before the collapse 
of communism, Ferenc Feher defined two main constituents of the “West”. 
First, he equalled the West to the emergence of three logics: capitalism, 
industrialisation, and democracy.2 At the same time, he argued for the relative 
independence of these logics from each other.3 Second, the “West” was 
distinguished by its universalizing project. By wanting the 'return to Europe' 
in 1989 the East, in Feher's terms, succumbed to the West’s universalising 
project. It wanted to embrace the logics the Soviet-type system lacked4, 
democracy and capitalism.
To conceive of the 'West' in Feher's lines seems to be adequate because 
of at least two major reasons. First, the strong desire of Eastern Europe to 
catch up with the West, to finally achieve the unification with the West in 
political and economic terms, is commonly acknowledged. In this vein, 
succumbing to the zeal for a jump to the market economy', the warnings 
about the risks of the radical economic programme “...drowned in the general 
demand for the 'return to European civilisation', that is to political democracy 
and the market.”5 Second, the principles of democracy and market economy
1 “Imitation is ... a powerful device of institutional innovation”, see: Offe, Claus (1994), 
p.37. See also: Morawski, Witold (1994), p.3()0.
2 Feher, Ferenc (1995), p.56.
2 There were several historical types of democracy without capitalism as well as different 
types of capitalism that were not necessarily linked to a democratic system. Similarly, 
“several times in history, the capitalist organisation of economic life has appeared and 
reappeared unaccompanied by industrialization.”, see: Feher, Ferenc (1995), p.56.
4 The third logic, industrialisation, was not among the desired aims to be imitated in 1989, 
mainly because this logic was the only one of the three mentioned that was inherent in the 
Soviet-type system, see: Feher, Ferenc (1995), p.61. Desires before and after 1989 
certainly were directed towards material goods, i.e. industrial products. Industrialisation, 
however, was associated in the East with heavy and military industries which did not 
satisfy the desires of Polish society. Most importantly, the Polish revolution of 1980 was 
accomplished against communism by the workers, the very core group of communist 
industrialisation.




























































































are considered to be the enabling conditions for a normalisation or 
consolidation of post-communist countries.
Although the communist East lacked the systems and patterns of 
behaviour constitutive to the West, they were not completely absent. While 
market principles were ideologically precluded, centrally planned economies 
were relatively permissive. This is illustrated by the scope of the second 
economy, and by the rise of ‘market socialism’ in Hungary since the late 
1960s and, to a minor extent, in Poland during the 1970s and 1980s. 
Similarly, over many decades Poland experienced spaces of freedom which 
developed into a ‘quasi-pluralism’ during the late 1980s. The worsening 
economic conditions in the late 1970s largely contributed to the emergence of 
Poland’s first large-scale democratic movement, the Solidarity trade union in 
1980. In its wake, Poland become enchanted with ‘democracy’. Thesis 1 of 
the Solidarity programme demanded “the realisation of a self-managed and 
democratic reform at all levels of the administration, of a new socio-economic 
oder, that combines plan, self-management and market.”'’
Accordingly, the East had a taste of the constituents of the West. To put 
it inversely, market economy and democracy were not entirely unfamiliar to 
Eastern Europe. Given this 'unofficial' encounter between the East and the 
constituents of the West, principal theoretical approaches to communism as 
theories of modernisation or convergence theory, operated with the 
assumption that communism could be overcome by a change or institutional 
reshuffling of the mix between government/state and market. According to 
Charles Lindblom, all politico-economic systems in the world can be 
characterised by different mixes of government and market.7 In a similar vein, 
in much of the sovietological thinking the “only difference between capitalism 
and socialism boiled down to different proportions of the same components.”8 
With hindsight, there is hardly any doubt that communism was “not a mixed 
economy but a fused economy.”9 According to this fusion principle, both 
politics and economics in communism lose the distinctive features 
characteristic of Western societies. “Everything is politicized, except politics, 
which is almost completely depoliticized...” and “under state socialism, 
everything focuses on the economy except economics, which is utterly de- 
economized, and as a result, is fully politicized.”10 This intertwining became
h Biischer, Barbara (1982), p.300.
7 See: Lindblom, Charles (1977).
“ See: Kaminski, Barttomiej (1991), p.6.
9 Kaminski, Barttomiej (1991), p.7.




























































































pathological in the Poland of the 1980s. This is why, “the introduction o f a 
market economy in the postsocialist countries is a 'political' project which 
has prospect only if it rests on a strong democratic legitimation.”(my italics)"
This apparent familiarity with the West before 1989 explains a great 
deal of why the transfer of democracy and capitalism was deemed to be 
relatively easy to achieve. Despite the unprecedented and experimental 
character of both the Round Table and the economic shock-therapy, “the 
catchphrase of the transition from communism was that 'there was nothing 
new to invent'”.12 Before 1989, the East trusted in the reliability of superior 
Western-based models of economic and political organisation. Accordingly, 
the economic policy aims of the 'shock-therapy' in 1989 and the first 
Solidarity-governments were couched in a language of 'tested models', 
'market mechanisms' and 'property structures'.13 As Marcin Swiecicki, the 
First Minister for Economic Cooperation declared: “In reforming our 
economy we do not seek experiments. We do not want our economists to 
invent new systems, but to adopt solutions that work elsewhere. We simply 
want to construct a market economy like the West's.”14 Regardless of 
nuances or ideological preferences the revolutions were considered to be 
accomplished by envisaging objective and coherent systems of thought and 
practices. Despite the on-going debate between radicals, liberals, gradualists 
or social-democrats about the shaping of the new order15, the catchwords of 
démocratisation and marketisation seem to be of uncontestable ascendancy.
Evidently, elements of market economy and democracy were not 
entirely absent in Eastern Europe. The logics of capitalism and democracy 
rose as reflected in attempts of marketisation and démocratisation in Poland 
of the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, under conditions of a communist system both 
projects were rather hazy, since did not rely on real knowledge but on 
suppositions.“The entire history of liberalism in the post-communist countries 
is nothing else but a number of attempts to transplant solutions that 
supposedly had been 'tested' elsewhere to local soil.”(my italics) 16 In turn, 
these Western logics escaped critical evaluation and a clear meaning. 
“Democracy was the primordial catchword written on the flags of the
"O ffe, Claus (1991), p.881.
12 Kaminski, Bartlomiej (1994), p.l.
11 See an overview in Przeworski, Adam (1993), pp. 141 ff.
14 In: Libération, 14 February 1990, p.32, cited in Przeworski, Adam (1993), p .l42.
15 See for a recent overview: Crawford, Beverly (1995). 




























































































Solidarity movement and as such it constituted an unquestioned good.” 17 *
“The point is precisely what is meant in operational terms by the only 
seemingly unequivocal concept of 'capitalism' or 'market economy'
This paper sets out to examine the quality of the distinctive logics of 
democracy and capitalism in the Polish context before 1989 and their 
translation in 1989. In Feher's view, all “three tendencies, or “dynamics”, or 
“constituents” have distinct institutions and an institutionalised network 
which presupposes a relatively independent learning process in each 
case.”19 Despite an alleged familiarity before 1989, capitalist and democratic 
institutions had to be still introduced on a large scale. Thus, “the designing of 
new institutions occurs through the replication of old or spatially distant 
ones.”20 Market economy and democracy were distant from Poland, they had 
to be translated into this new environment and their application had to be 
learnt anew.
In fact, since 1989 a myriad of democratic and market institutions has 
been introduced. The distance between East and West has formally been 
shortened. However, democratic institutions in Poland are afflicted by volatile 
and unstable landscape of political parties. “There is a sense of ‘old wine, 
new bottles’ as one looks at the landscape of increasing alienation and 
disillusionment, voter apathy, and distance between the leaders and the led in 
post-communist Poland.”(my italics) 21 Trust and confidence in democratic 
and market institutions is particularly low.22 The driving force of the changes 
in 1989, economic and political liberalism, has widely failed in its missionary 
attempt both politically and economically.23 Despite positive macroeconomic 
indicators, the big dilemma of the state’s large-scale involvement in the 
economy has not been resolved. Since 1995, Polish politics and Polish society 
was anew highly polarised around the historical division lines between (post- 
communists and (post-) Solidarity. Moroever, democratic consolidation is 
supposed to be very lenghty, while capitalism has been recently declared to 
be enemy number one to an open society in Eastern Europe.24
17 Kowalski, Sergiusz (1990), p.87.
IS Offe, Claus (1991), p.880.
19 Feher, Ferenc (1995), p.56.
20 Offe, Claus (1996), p.212.
21 Curry, Jane Leftwich/Fajfer, Laba (1996), p.245.
22 See: Sztompka, Piotr (1996).
23 See for the best account: Jerzy Szacki (1995).




























































































On these grounds, the question arises whether the shortening of distance 
in 1989 was at all based on the adoption of democracy and capitalism. The 
sudden and unexpected encounter between Poland and the West in 1989 
rather suggests that democracy and capitalism could not unfold as 
independent learning processes. As the magic term ‘return to Europe’ shows, 
1989 was rather about a general identification than about complex learning- 
processes. This opens up for the conjecture that the models of imitation in the 
void of the communist collapse were different from the logics of democracy 
and capitalism. Subsequently, this paper develops a theoretical framework to 
examine the gaining of knowledge over a distance. In doing so, it elaborates 
upon the dominant models in the Polish transition that are pinpointed as the 
images of the “West” and as the image of the trade union Solidarity.
I. 1. Imitation as Transfer of Knowledge from ‘Elsewhere’
Innovation research in organisations defined innovation as “an idea, 
practice, or object perceived as new by an individual or other relevant unit of 
adoption...If the idea is perceived as new and different to the adopting unit, it 
is an innovation.”25 According to another definition, innovation “is the work 
of many people and is related to the adoption of some new invention or 
discovery on the level of behavior, of action. Innovation involves new 
behavior, new habits, new interlocking expectations...”2f> What matters in 
these approaches to learning and knowledge-transfer are the sources of 
knowledge and their points of destination. The separating space, the distance 
is not considered to be a major problem. Yet, spatially or temporally distant 
points, as the East and the West in our case, suggest a basic contextual 
difference between the original setting and the point of destination. The main 
concern should thus focus on the enabling conditions for the application of 
transferred knowledge in a new environment, i.e. the shortening of distance.
The East-West divide has been one of the major paradigms long before 
communism deepened the distance between the two.27 Commonly, Eastern 
Europe was considered to be backward and thus in need of modernisation. 
The switch from backwardness to modernisation is commonly regarded as a 
transfer of knowledge that is beneficiary to the point of destination. To 
modernise means to create or to enhance knowledge. In these lines, after 
1989 it was considered to be “...best for the responsible elites...in Eastern
’5 Rogers, Everett/Rogers, Kim (1985), pp.87 ff. 
2I' Deutsch, Karl (1985), p.19f.




























































































Europe to 'shop around' for models and implementation of modernization that 
seem optimal for particular institutions.”2* In a similar vein, the concept of 
lesson-drawing asserted: “The process of lesson-drawing starts with scanning 
programmes in effect elsewhere, and ends with the prospective evaluation of 
what would happen if a programme already in effect elsewhere were 
transferred here in future.” Lesson is defined as “knowledge that is 
instructive, a conclusion about a subject drawn after the fact from observation 
or experiences. In its most primitive form, a lesson is the assertion of 'what 
everyone knows'.”29 One can sense an almost intrinsic linkage between 'what 
everyone knows' and 'only game in town'30 as a symbol for a consolidated 
democracy.
There is good reason to assume that in spite of great efforts the distance 
between Poland and the West has not been sufficiently reduced and 
‘elsewhere’ remains distant. 'Elsewhere' means distant be it in geographical, 
temporal and also mental terms. The fascination with 'elsewhere' in 
communist countries amounted to an obsessive mystification. It was given a 
literary monument by Milan Kundera’s ‘Life is Elsewhere’. First ‘elsewhere’ 
was mystified because a better life was systematically withheld from people. 
Second, imitation provided for the identification with this distant ‘elsewhere’ 
which was believed to be infinitely better than the bleak reality of 
communism. How could ‘elsewhere’ be pulled closer, how could distance be 
reduced?
1.2. Pulling ‘Elsewhere’ Closer - Action at a Distance
In his pioneering work on imitation, the French sociologist Gabriel Tarde 
defined imitation as action at a distance. In his understanding, this mechanism 
enables imitations across geographical and temporal distances. 
“L'imitation....s'exerce, non seulement de très loin, mais à de grands 
intervalles de temps. Elle établit un rapport fécond entre un inventeur et un 
copiste séparés par des milliers d'années, entre Lycurgue et un 
conventionnel de Paris, entre le peintre romain, qui a peint une fresque de 
Pompéi et le dessinateur moderne qui s'en inspiref More recently, the 
French sociologist and philosopher of science Bruno Latour developed the 
concept of action at a distance by studying the knowledge transfer in the 
wake of eighteenth-century explorations of distant regions. Latour claimed
2,1 Tiryakian, Edward (1995), p.259.
29 Rose, Richard (1991), p.7.
50 See: Linz, Juan (1996).




























































































that knowledge cannot be defined without understanding what gaining 
knowledge means. In other words, knowledge is not something that could be 
described by itself or by opposition to 'ignorant' or to 'belief', but only by 
considering a whole cycle of accumulation.32 At the centre of Latour's interest 
stands the search for the mechanism that allows for the feeding of 'centres of 
calculation' which pile up information in order to seize control of the world 
that is being discovered. Initially, there is the disorientation of navigators who 
arrive at an unknown island and lack any knowledge or familiarity with it. 
The repeated effort of going there would be in vain, if it was not backed up 
by the cumulation of reliable information and knowledge. Only the organised 
and channeled communication to centres of calculation enabled science to 
draw reliable knowledge from these explorations.
According to Latour the distance must be overcome, if the knowledge 
gained in the exploration of a distant island is to be successfully translated 
into the actual space or situation in which it is supposed to be used. He 
elaborates three key elements that reply to the question: “how to act at a 
distance on unfamiliar events, places and people? Answer: by somehow 
bringing home these events, places and people.” This means first: 'Mobility' 
is achieved by inventing means that render events, places and people mobile 
so that they can be brought back; Second: 'Stability', to keep them stable so 
that they can be moved back and forth without....additional distortion, 
corruption or decay; Third, 'Combinability', so that whatever stuff they are 
made of, they can be accumulated, aggregated, or shuffled like a pack of 
cards.”33 Distant places were thus mobilised by mobiles (which included 
knowledge, information, capital, maps, drawings, readings) and brought home 
to centres of calculation. The reliability of these mobiles made them stable 
and allowed for combinations with further knowledge that had been collected 
elsewhere (on different islands) and by different explorers. Consequently, 
action at a distance is made up by stable and combinable mobiles. In Latour's 
terms, a successful action at a distance leads to the domination of the world. 
This becomes clear when one looks at how the carthographer came to 
dominate the world as a consequence of a cycle of accumulating the 
information provided.
In 1989, a vague familiarity and ‘second-hand’ knowledge about market 
economy and democracy as systems of rules and institutions should be 
replaced by the official adoption of these logics. Taking Latour's framework,
12 Latour, Bruno (1987), p.220ff.




























































































the following analysis probes which were the stable and combinable mobiles 
to be translated in the Polish case order to undo the existing distance. A 
translation in Latour’s understanding is a situation or process “in which one 
actor or force is able to require or count upon a particular way of thinking and 
acting from another, hence assembling them together into a network not 
because of legal or institutional ties or dependencies, but because they have 
come to construe their problem in allied ways and their fate as in some way 
bound up with one another.(my italics)34 In fact, the common fate of East and 
West has been a dominant and recurrent theme in Eastern Europe, as the 
omnipresence of imitation processes proves. “While Soviet societies 
compete, at the same time, they parasitically co-exist, especially in the 
technological sense, with the ‘West’ and develop certain functions in 
imitation of, and in response to, Western societies.”35 The collapse of 
communism thus was a consequence of this common fate, “precisely because 
its utopian project of catching up with the West had not been achieved”.3'’ In 
1989, this common fate which bound up East and West became 
overwhelming. Unsettled by recurrent crises, Poland had to “turn towards the 
West, because otherwise a complete catastrophe menaced.”37 The jump to the 
market economy was induced by the 'economic spirit' that wanted the 'return 
to Europe'.38 Fundamentally, in 1989 Poland wanted to bring something back 
from which it had been distanced for a long time.
I. 3. The Isolated Islands of the East
It might be objected: The jump from eighteenth century explorations to 
recent East European transformations which implicate the reconstruction of 
complex institutions and a whole social order is too audacious. In fact, such 
an analogy dares to juxtapose the gaining of knowledge in a structurally 
simple process with a complex relations in a whole society. Yet, the crucial 
conditions, namely distance and lack of knowledge are met in the void of the 
communist collapse. What is more, “the post-communist countries were 
hardly on the verge of the return to Western liberal democracy, from which 
they were hopelessly far removed not only under the rule of communism but 
also earlier.”39 Distance from Western modernity ruled Eastern European
34 See: Latour, Bruno (1987), p.10.
35 Feher, Ferenc (1995), p.57.
36 Brus, WIodzimierz/Laski, Kazimierz (1989), p.33.
37 Kaminski, Antoni, Strzalkowski, Piotr (1994), p.309.
3S Sachs, Jeffrey (1994), p.5.




























































































reality, since “for the last several decades these countries have lived in rather 
deep isolation, which without completely destroying the feeling of ties with 
the West nevertheless did rupture many real ties.”40 In turn, the West 
instinctively fears the East, a consequence of misunderstandings and lack of 
knowledge which precedes the World War and the imposition of Soviet 
Communism, as Norman Davies argued. Evoking the Czech crisis in 1938, 
the author of the most authoritative book on Polish history related the attitude 
of the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain who referred to 
Czechoslovakia, Poland’s neighbour, as a “distant country about which we 
know nothing”. As Davies stressed, the word “distant” signified not a 
geographical but an emotional distance.41
Distance from the West ruled also Poland’s economy.42 A comparison 
between Poland’s international position in the inter-war period and in 1989 is 
revealing. Polish National Income per capita in 1938 was approximately 
seven times lower than in the US, six times lower than in Great Britain, five 
times lower than in Germany, about 50% lower than in Italy and Finland, and 
oscillated around the value of Spanish national income. It was somewhat 
higher than that of Portugal and Greece. Despite the ‘socialist’ progress under 
communism a juxtaposition with Poland’s economic situation in 1989 shows 
a considerably larger distance between Poland and the West. In terms of 
Gross National product per capita, Poland had further fallen behind the 
richest countries (the GNP in the US was 12 times, in Germany 11 times and 
in France 10 times higher). Most tangible, however, was the distance between 
the Polish and other formerly peripherical economies. While Finland, Spain 
and Italy had nearly been at the Polish level in 1938, in 1989 GNP in Finland 
was 12 times higher, in Italy 8 times, in Spain 5 times, in Greece 3 times, and 
in Portugal 2,5 times higher than in Poland. The economic depression played 
an important role in advocating radical economic solutions to replace the 
decayed centrally planned economy. In this vein, a common claim held that 
neo-liberal ideology coined the reasoning of the Solidarity trade union.43
A closer look allows to detect that, on the contrary, the lack of concepts 
and strategies in Solidarity at the end of the 1980s was blatant. Already in 
1980 and 1981 Solidarity was prevented from accumulation of knowledge 
and of social learning by its proper mentality. “The inability to generalize the
411 Szacki, Jerzy (1995), p.44.
41 Davies, Norman on the occasion of a lecture entitled “Eastern Europe: myth or reality”, 
held in July 1995 in Warsaw, see: Rzeczpospolila 3 July 1995.
42 See the data in Landau, Zbigniew/Roszkowski, Wojciech (1995), pp.287-289.




























































































movement's experience and to put it into an abstract formula created a barrier 
to the accumulation of knowledge and social learning in Solidarity. In such a 
situation the personal experience of the movement's leaders has a double 
value; the fact that the knowledge gained by the movement's activists cannot 
be transferred is a useful rationalization and a half-conscious self-justification 
for leaders who want to retain their positions as long as possible.”44
While this inability was conspicuous before the Round Table, it became 
acute after Solidarity's triumph in the June-elections of 1989. The very same 
day Jacek Kurori declared on TV why Solidarity could not possibly take over 
power: “We were unprepared, without leadership, without any concept.”45 
Similarly, the ascendancy of a well-established 'neo-liberal ideology' did not 
stretch over more than very few specialists. In an evaluation of the situation in 
June 1989, that is right between the closure of the Round Table and the 
instauration of the Mazowiecki-government, the reality of diffusion of 
supposed models appeared to be rather imaginary: “...the neo-liberals are 
very active and popular in Poland. They intend to abolish socialism and take 
recourse to capitalism in order to cope with the crisis. They come up with 
solutions a la Friedman and with the example of Chile. One has to take stock 
of the fact that no analysis of what really happened in Chile has been 
published either in the press of the liberals, of Solidarity or in the official 
press.”46 Furthermore, the meaning of economic liberalism before and after 
1989 was completely blurred, since its propagation was ruled by ignorance. 
Rather, naive beliefs in profits without losses and in immediate results was 
characteristic for its protagonists.47 One can sense their hazy conception of 
market economy in the degree of suspicion it evoked among Solidarity-elites: 
“The project of shock-therapy, introduced half a year later by the first 
Solidarity-government, still at the outset of 1989 was ideologically and 
politically unacceptable for usual trade unionists, but also for their leaders.”48 
The foregoing picture affirms: Action (in terms of policies or institution­
building) must be brought (back) in by relying on geographically and mentally 
(historically) distant reference-points. The catchword of the Polish ‘revolution 
from above’ in fact underlines the crucial importance of elites in 1989. Quite 
a similar idea to that of elites as explorers is Arnold Toynbee's concept of the 
intelligentsia as liaison-officers between civilisations, recently introduced by
44 Staniszkis, Jadwiga (1984), p. 137.
45 Kurori, Jacek in an interview in Zycie Gospodarcze 23/1991, p.4.
46 Warszawski, David (1989), p.8.
47 See: Szacki, Jerzy (1994), p.211.




























































































Zygmunt Bauman49 into the discussion on Eastern Europe. Yet, in the Central 
European context even these elites have their problems in surmounting the 
existing distance: “...in most countries, practically all modem specialization 
came into being during the communist rule and the specialists have no 
collective, institutionalised memory of professional life under any other 
conditions.”50 Lacking experience in virtually all respects, the Solidarity elites 
in 1989 were comparable to explorers, just landed or being thrown on the 
unknown and alien territory of démocratisation and marketisation, ignorant of 
its measures, its dangers, and the tasks to tackle. Contrary to common belief 
for example, Leszek Balcerowicz the main architect of the shock-therapy, did 
not seek the mandate so as to apply ‘neo-liberal ideology’ to Polish economy. 
After an exhaustive search for candidates he had to be persuaded 
painstakingly to assume the portfolio of the Minister of Finance.51 In addition, 
his own account cast doubts about the conditions for policy-learning and 
prospective evaluation: “...I did not have - and nobody had - experience in 
guiding a post-socialist economy in the period of transformation.”52
I", summer 1989, the journalist David Warszawski stated: “For the time 
being, everybody in Poland is alone on earth, nobody has seen, has read 
nothing. We start from scratch.”53 Given the ascendancy of distance, Poland 
under communism itself had become an “island” where the “transmission of 
ideas had been completely blocked” and many things had to be (re-) invented 
anew.54 Such an isolation in terms of knowledge resembles to what Karl 
Mannheim called 'docility' in aristocratic-authoritarian regimes and 'self­
neutralization' in democracies. “The former consists in the mass of people 
being prevented from learning, from acquiring new knowledge.” In the latter, 
“....we often observe failure to think and learn due to the fact that the people 
let some organization or machinery do their thinking for them.”55 While 
adequate for democracies, this assertion seems to fit even better when it is 
inserted into the context of the so-called Peoples' Democracies with the 
declared omniscient ruling party machinery.
49 Bauman, Zygmunt (1993)
50 Bauman, Zygmunt (1989), p.85.
51 See the account in Kuczyhski, Waldemar (1992), p.55.
52 Balcerowicz, Leszek (1995), p.204.
53 Warszawski, David (1989), p.9.
54 See: Warszawski, David (1989), p.9.




























































































I. 4. Shortening the Distance - the Islands' in the West and in the
Past
The breaking point of 1989 implied to shorten the distances with models 
existing elsewhere. In this vein, since the 1980s a couple of foreign models 
were addressed in political and economic discourse.56 The Spanish model 
should be imitated to leave real socialism in an ordered and peaceful way. 
Finland was often referred to as a possible solution that would give Poland a 
limited sovereignty and certain independence from the Soviet Union. Already 
in 1980, Lech Watgsa equated Poland to a ‘second Japan’. This model was 
associated with quick modern industrialisation and economic growth, but also 
stressed the role of the state in steering and shaping the economy. The 
reference to the Swedish or Scandinavian model, rather popular around 1989, 
stressed the aspects of state intervention in markets and social welfare.57 
While the aforementioned models belonged to the 1980s, a model for Poland 
in the 1990s could be Turkey. Its model-function is buttressed by a couple of 
aspects achieved by Turked. First, there is its situation at the crossing 
between East and West, like Poland. Second, it stresses political stability and 
NATO-membership. Third, despite deep religious traditions Turkey has 
become a secular state.
As this overview suggests, the imitating revolutions in Eastern Europe - 
with Poland as the trailblazer, addressed a virtually infinite number of models. 
“Although there are many submodels within Western Europe, with distinct 
versions of the modern welfare state, the Western European economies share 
a common core of capitalist institutions. It is that common core that should be 
the aim of the Eastern European reforms. The finer points of choosing 
between different submodels -the Scandinavian social welfare state, 
Thatcherism, the German social market - can be put off until later, once the 
core institutions are firmly in place.”58 The common denominator, however, 
was the identity with the general cultural, economic, and political model. 
“Poland wants to be like the states of the European Community.”59
Yet, imitation over a distance in the Polish context was not limited to 
geographical or mental distance. It also included the “recapturing of the past”. 
Accordingly, also the past is full of 'islands', prone to be addressed by action 
at a distance. Their reality is illustrated by the blurs and distortions of
5,1 A concise overview can be found in Koztowski, Pawct (1995), pp. 125-134. 
57 See: Kowalik, Tadeusz (1993).
5S Sachs, Jeffrey (1994), p.5.




























































































identities that were constructed after the Second World War on both sides of 
the iron curtain, though differently for either of them. In Eastern Europe, 
nothing could “make burst the past that had been frozen into ice” by the 
Soviet-driven mythologisation of the liberation from Nazi-Germany by the 
Soviets in the name of equality, fraternity and liberty.60 In relation to the post­
war order of 1945, the reign of a distant past was evident: “...the 1945 
settlement....was a colossal feat of political engineering. However, in almost 
every East European country, it is interpreted as the culmination of a natural 
historical process, and is constantly rationalized by reference to distant 
historical events, real or imagined.”61 These various distant reference-points 
cause that “for East Europeans the past is not simply a different country, but a 
whole archipel of vulnerable historical territories that must be protected from 
the attacks and distortions by the inhabitants of the neighbouring island of 
memory.”6" Accordingly, action at a distance also points to different islands 
in the past. Contrary to Western Europe, the Eastern part of Europe owns too 
many pasts, among which Judt enumerates the following reference-points: 
1918-1921, 1938, 1939, 1941, 1944, 1945-1948, 1956, 1968 and 1989.
It is striking that Tony Judt omitted the emergence of the Solidarity trade 
union in 1980 as perhaps the most incisive crisis both for an Eastern 
European society and for a communist regime. It was in Poland of this epoch 
where hope soared the highest and where, 16 months later, the despair was 
deepest. Most importantly, it is in this ‘island of the past’, where the germs of 
démocratisation in the Polish case are located. Although they became largely 
obsolete in 1989, there were crucial links between Solidarity in 1981 and 
Solidarity in 1988/89. One could refer to this linkage as action at a temporal 
distance.
This linkage over a temporal distance should be illustrated by one 
example. A comparison of data as regards the two National Congresses of 
Solidarity in 1981 and in 1990, gives the following results. Whereas the 
average age of delegates was 36 years in 1981, it amounted to 42 in 1990.63 
Only 36 of the 487 delegates to the Congress of April 1990 had participated 
in 1981. More important is the proportion concerning the members of the 
National Commission (Komisja Krajowa), the highest directive board of the
“  Judt, Tony (1993), p. 103 
1,1 Davies, Norman (1981), p.517.
62 Judt, Tony (1993), p. 103.
61 Tygodnik Snlidnrnosc, 22 April 1990, p.24 and Congress Post, Gdansk 6 September 
1981, cited after: Strobel. Günther. "NSZZ Solidarnosc”, in Bingen, Dieter (ed.). 1985. 




























































































Solidarity trade union, elected in September 1981. Out of the 107 members - 
made up of 69 elected by the National Congress, and the chairmen of 38 
regional guiding boards, only 20 came as delegates to the Congress in April 
1990.64 65Hence, 20 of the 36 delegates who participated in both Congresses 
were members of the National Commission. The provided data indicate two 
apparently opposite developments. Taking its leading circles, at the end of the 
1980s Solidarity was an aging organisation. On the one hand, the continuity 
of the National Commission between 1981 and 1990 was relatively low 
which indicates a high loss of union leaders during the underground. On the 
other hand, those who remained in 1990, belonged mainly to the National 
Commission. Accordingly, there was a generational distance with a relatively 
high stability of a core of leading figures. It is in line with Gabriel Tarde's 
concept of imitation as action at a distance: L'imitation est une génération à 
distance. The top-ranks of Solidarity in 1988/89 were essentially the same 
as in 1980/81, whereas the active basis at the shop-floor level was made up 
by the new generation. Essentially, there were relatively few central 
individual figures to serve as a linkage between the Solidarity I and Solidarity 
II.66
Drawing on the foregoing, a fourth aspect of distance comes to the fore. 
In slogans like revolution from above' or 'transformation as an elite-bargain' 
the idea of liaison-officers touches upon the “...enormous distance between 
elites and publics, politics and economics, on the one hand, and the social 
base, on the other ...”67 Subsequently, the quality of translatable mobiles 
should be tested also for the congruity between the two distant spheres of 
acting elites and passive society.
Summing up, one can safely argue that 1989 can be analysed in the light 
of a double impact of the island-effect. On the one hand, in 1989 Poland was 
equivalent to an isolated island that lacked expert knowledge and experience 
with the Western logics of democracy and capitalism. All of a sudden, this 
island opened up in 1989 and had to be fed with all the things that had been 
witheld from it earlier, say knowledge, ideas, information. On the other hand,
64 “Co si? stalo z nasz;j klasij?” (What happened to our class?”), Tygodnik G dan ski, 22 
April 1990, pp. 25-27.
65 Tarde, Gabriel (1993), p.37.
“  Solidarity 1 refers to the whole of experiences and associates related to the first period 
of Solidarity in 1980 and 1981, while Solidarity II refers to the period of the late 1980s 
when Solidarity emerged from the underground and took up first opposition and then 
government-activities.



























































































knowledge was supposed to be gathered, to be accumulated by drawing it 
from various distant islands in order to bring it to the own country. Having 
located the wider area of islands, where knowledge was supposed to be 
drawn from, we can set out to examine the basis for imitation, namely the 
providing islands of the West and of the Solidarity-past. In the following 
section the concept of action at a distance will be applied to the Polish 
situation in 1989. By this, it will refer both to the context of the Round Table 
in early 1989 and to the adoption of the economic shock-therapy by the first 
Solidarity-government in late 1989.
II. Adopting Distant Mobiles: ‘Market’ and ‘Trade Union’
II. 1. Market socialism and Démocratisation before 1989
Before applying Latour's concept of stable and combinable mobiles to 
the Polish situation in 1989, the ‘career’ of capitalism and democracy in the 
Polish context of the 1970s and 1980s should be briefly reviewed. At the 
latest since the early 1970s, the attraction of the Western world could be 
sensed in a twofold way. First, there was Edward Gierek's bid for building a 
“second Poland” in the early 1970s. Gierek’s economic policy opened up 
Poland towards the West in order to profit from the blessings of the market 
by means of a credits-financed consumerist boom. The drive towards an 
other, say better, organisation of the economy was also urged by the decay of 
the Polish economy.68 Second, after the proclamation of martial law in 1981 
and under conditions of deep economic crisis, the Jaruzelski-regime opted for 
an economic reform that aimed at somehow restoring its damaged political 
legitimacy. In a two stages-reform (the first part in 1982, the second in 1987) 
it was envisaged to regulate a competitive market by central plan. It is 
important to consider that “the overall objective of the second stage reform 
was the introduction of a viable combination of planning and effective 'self- 
regulatory market mechanism...”69 On the whole, the purpose of 'market' 
reforms in the understanding of the communist regime lay in the corrective 
capacity the 'market' could have on the havoc caused by a centrally planned 
economy. A communist state aims to control directly all economic activities, 
the process of economic growth, and the allocation of assets. Its political 
aspiration is to extend its rule over all domains of public life and to suppress 
group and individual interests. In turn, “...fusion determines the political and
68 See:Landau, Zbigniew/Roszkowski, Wojciech (1995), p.262.




























































































economic logic of state socialism.” 70 Not by chance, the construction of 
Polish market socialism in the late 1980s was termed 'political capitalism'.71 
This concept hinted at the guiding role of the Nomenklatura in the fledgling 
process of privatisation at the end of the 1980s. Intertwining the processes of 
démocratisation and marketisation, this communist-driven opening up was 
rightly called a “technique of Westernisation in Eastern Europe”.(my italics)72 
Summing up Kaminski’s points, it can be argued that the distance from 
market is constitutive to the existence of a communist system. In fact, several 
studies of state socialist economies unanimously stressed the fundamental 
'otherness' of market economies to centrally planned economies.73 Similarly, 
it was shown that during the 1980s the introduction of the 'market' was 
desired by a rising number of Polish people.74 In addition, under conditions of 
economic crisis the traditionally tight links of Poles with their Western 
neighbours in terms of temporary work-activities in Western countries 
translated into a high rate of willingness to take up a job in the West.75 At the 
end of the 1980s, it was all about pulling closer the distinct other: the market.
Like market principles, democratic institutions were distant from the 
communist system and thus their potential introduction was very much 
advocated. Howevers, the notions 'democracy' and 'democratic' were abused 
of in the sense “that they become synonomous with all which is good and 
absent from the world governed by the system. Under conditions of lack of 
democracy every thing or value that would have been perceived as a desired 
element of social life would be fitted in the meaning of democracy. As a 
slogan of political emancipation the term democracy becomes too broad, 
absorbing the whole of collective aspiration and desire. The differentiation of 
conscious and justified usages of the term from a ritualistic and masked 
usages can thus be sometimes made difficult.”76
This notwithstanding, for quite a few advocates of democratic 
reconstruction the Underground-Solidarity77 appeared to be sufficiently
7,1 Kaminski, Bartlomiej (1991), p.24.
71 Staniszkis, Jadwiga (1991).
72 Staniszkis, Jadwiga (1991), p.128.
77 Next to Kaminski's study, see: Dembinski, Pawet (1991) and Kornai, Janos (1992).
74 See the studies by Witold Morawski (1994), Aleksander Borkowski (1994) and Lena 
Kolarska-Bobiriska (1990, 1994).
75 Such a desire was expressed by nearly sixty percent of the inquired population, see: 
Mason, David/Nelson, Daniel/Szlarski, Bogdan (1991), p.216.
76 Kowalski, Sergiusz (1990), p.88.




























































































prepared and ideologically equipped to tackle the task of démocratisation. 
Both scholars and activists attributed to the Underground-Solidarity a stability 
in terms of strategy and staff. Thus, it was assumed that Solidarity “by 1986 
...was almost entirely a movement for systemic reform...”78 Solidarity was 
also characterised as an “...elite that cohered, and even in its current divided 
and divisive state offers Poland something more important than either 
marketization or civil society: an 'established' leadership.”79 In a summary of 
the underground-period Janusz Patubicki, the Solidarity-chairman in Poznan, 
held that Solidarity union leaders had been sufficiently retrained before 1989 
in order to tackle the tasks that they were expected to fulfill.80
The presumed prepardness of the Underground-Solidarity as an 
organisation for démocratisation was challenged by the assessment of the 
Paris-based periodical of the opposition “Kultura” that drew a bleak picture: 
“Without organisational projects, without a programme that could replace the 
nostalgic reclamation of the Gdansk-accords, the national executive board of 
Solidarity in its current shape has become a rudimentary remainder from 
another epoch, incapable of elaborating a policy that would be adequate to 
the presence and directed towards the future.”81 In 1988, Solidarity was 
caught off-hand by the communist party's sudden readiness to negotiate. 
“Despite the many years they had passed dreaming of this chance, the 
opposition-leaders were not - either as regards expert knowledge or 
psychologically - at all ready to tackle this game.”82 Before the communists 
signalled their willingness to sit at the Round Table, the programmatic 
guidelines of the underground period (the 'Long March' and the general 
strike) were superseded. The first document since 1981, by which Solidarity 
in August 1988 addressed the communist regime spoke about Solidarity's 
support for economic reforms in exchange for the legalisation of Solidarity. 
The draft declaration on behalf of the inaugural agreement with the regime 
still contained the proposal of “establishing relations towards approaching 
elections on the basis of a constructive relationship of broad societal support, 
including Solidarity.” During the three following days, however, Solidarity's 
declarations were considerably softened. The final version, apart from 
omitting to mention the 'anti-crisis pact' just limited itself to the formula of a
™ Ost, David (1990), p.25.
79 Jowitt, Ken (1992), p.295.
Patubicki, Janusz. “Dtugi Marsz” (Long March), Gazela Wyhorcza, 23 April 1990.
81 In Kultura, No.6, 1988, p.40 cited in Skórzyiiski. Jan (1995), p.68.




























































































“cooperation for the democratic concern.” As Skorzynski rightly stated, this 
could mean everything and nothing.83
Contrary to the expectations, the tasks and strategies of Solidarity did 
not mature. As illustrated in inquiries among the delegates to the Second 
National Congress of Solidarity in April 1990 the first priority was to “realise 
democracy, because there is too little”, while the second priority was “to 
combat communism, because there is too much.”84 Although Solidarity 
envisaged objectives like “freedom”, an “anti-crisis pact” (later on: free 
elections), these objectives were subordinated to the overarching desire to 
resuscitate Solidarity as a trade union.
II. 2. The Mobile ‘Market’
The absence of markets and the common belief of communists and 
Solidarity-opposition in the remedying effect of the 'market' on the economic 
crisis can be expressed in the frame of action at a distance: 'market' was the 
mobile, in Latour's terms, to be pulled closer from a distance. ‘Market’ 
supposedly combined the thrust towards the archipel of islands, denoted the 
West, without divisions into independent logics claimed by Feher. As a 
reviewer of Paul Berman’s ‘A Tale of Two Utopias’ put it, “East Central 
Europe’s love affair with ‘the market’ was no doubt partly a simple matter of 
deprived people hankering for a properity they had glimpsed at a distance.”85
‘Market’ was mobilised so as to resolve or at least to mitigate the 
economic crisis. Following Latour’s thread of logic, the question arises: How 
stable was this mobile? To what extent the mobile ‘market’ could be adopted 
without, to use Latour’s terms, distortions, corruption or decay? The first 
thing to puzzle us in this respect is the incoherence of the statements in public 
opinion polls before and after 1989. While market-type solutions (the 
introduction of private property, wage-differentiation, privatisation of state 
enterprises, dismissal of workers) encountered increasing support among the 
polled population, a high proportion of Polish society declared to stick to the 
achievements of state socialism, highlighting employment security, state price 
controls and social services.86 In other words, the desire towards market' 
rose in Polish society as highly combined with crucial characteristics of a 
communist economy. The discrepancy or incoherence as to the expectations
83 Skorzynski, Jan (1995), pp.87-88.
84 See: Kuczyriski, Pawel/Nowotny, Stawomir (1994), p.249.
85 Ryan, Alan. The New York Review o f Bootes, Vol.43, No. 16, October 17, 1996, p.39.




























































































about 'market economy' points to the existence of a 'myth of the market' in 
the Poland of the 1980s.87
In this context, there is a striking similarity between the ‘myth of 
economic reform’, so fundamental to the communist attempts of redressing 
the economic crisis, and the ‘myth of the market’. ‘Market’ as the central 
mobile embraced a whole range of conceptions associated with this term. The 
mobile ‘market’ was mainly based on myths and, therefore, not stable. This 
instability is confirmed by its high combinability. In the pre-1989 context, 
'market' could amount to a garbage can. Adam Michnik reflected upon the 
blur of meanings: “We agree that a market is necessary, but what kind of 
market? A ruthless market according to Milton Friedman and the Chicago 
boys, or, perhaps a market with a human face that will not, in its ideological 
consequences, be an apology for egotism, brutality and the Roman maxim 
Homo homini lupus? A market in which mercy rather than ruthlessness will 
pay, because only this kind of market will allow the redistribution of goods 
needed to save our country from violent upheavals of social discontent?”88 89A 
remarkable study of the translatability of five key words (among which 
market-ing) in the business and management vocabulary from English into 
Polish language called attention to the deep differences between the 
meanings, current usages and associates key terms like 'market' could imply. 
Thus, “....the transition to a market economy is less a matter of knowledge 
transfer, but more one of meaning transfer, and that the western side has 
grossly underestimated the difficulties involved.”8'7
In spite of, or rather, because of its unclear meaning, 'market' was the 
most articulate and perhaps most definite “other” to be detected in pre-1989 
Poland. ‘Market’ had been, above all, distant from communist societies. It 
was there - at a distance or elsewhere - from where it should be pulled 
closer. As argued above, the proclaimed belief in the otherness of market and 
in its superiority made up for the stability of the mobile ‘market’. All the 
efforts of communist power and of oppositional elites aspired to bring in any 
form of 'market'. Of course, different ideological camps pursued different 
aims. For such an assumption speaks also the set-up of the anti-crisis pact of 
1987. Taking the failed referendum on the economic reform in 1987 as a 
starting point, the Solidarity opposition saw a potential for negotiations only
87 See: Kolarska-Bobiriska, Lena (1990), p. 161.
88 Cited in Szacki, Jerzy (1995), p.140, footnote 74.




























































































in the economic field.90 By contrast, moves towards democratic liberalisation, 
i.e. political agreements were excluded until the very eve of the Round Table 
negotiations. After the end of the Round Table it was widely taken as a 
surprise that substantial progress - against the expectations - had been 
achieved in democratic institution-building and not in economic matters.91
The meaning of market was double-edged and so were the expectations 
associated with it. Under 'market socialism', it was hoped to shift some of the 
caring responsibilities of the state on the market.92 In communist reasoning, 
the mobilisation of market-principles was directed to remedy the crisis of 
communism. On the other hand, for non-communist economic reformers the 
introduction of the market aimed at dismantling state socialism as deeply and 
as quickly as possible. This tendency reached its peak in the adoption of the 
economic shock-therapy in late 1989, most notably reflected in the zeal for 
profound stabilisation, liberalisation and broad-scale privatisation. Given the 
unstable meaning and the almost infinite combinability of ‘market’ as a 
concept, it is no surprise that between the plan of reform, proposed by the last 
communist prime minister Rakowski and the Balcerowicz plan, “...there was 
little difference the eye of an economist could spot.”93 Be it for the purpose of 
'market socialism', for 'political capitalism', or for the 'shock-therapy', it was 
always market' that was mobilised. While material goods, as well as 
privatisation, freedom and economic reform played an important role, all 
these dynamics hinged on the magic attraction exerted by 'market'. ‘Market’ 
was used as a panacea by all political currents, while its meaning was, to 
speak in Latour’s terms, arbitrarily “shuffled like a pack of cards”.
II. 3. The Mobile ‘Trade Union’
The establishment of an independent, self-governing trade union in 1980 
in connection with the programmatic key-point of a self-governing republic 
amounted to the 'identity-card' of Solidarity in 1980/81. Consequently, in 
1989 “only the recognition of Solidarity's right to legal existence would mean 
to cancel the military dictatorship and to open up a political path to 
democratic transformation.”94 While the political 'strategy' of the Solidarity- 
opposition was shaping “according to on-going events...the stable point in
1 See: Skórzyriski, Jan (1995), p.202.
91 See: Skórzyriski, Jan (1995), p.203.
92 Bauman, Zygmunt (1994), pp.20/21.
93 Bauman, Zygmunt (1993), p.142.




























































































it....was the postulate of the relegalisation of the union.”95 This was the only 
clearly formulated and steadfastily pursued demand for the negotiations at the 
Round Table. In terms of action at a distance, ‘trade union’ was the mobile 
by which Solidarity's claims for démocratisation could become viable and 
authoritative.
To bring the trade union back in constituted the central mobile, the 
central reference-point for the Solidarity-explorers in the Round Table 
negotiations. The particular impact of imitation in the process of bringing the 
trade union back is mirrored in a symbolical event of mediating a conflict. 
During the May strikes in 1988 the Catholic Church with the consent of the 
communists induced the mediation of the conflict. To this purpose, three 
mediatiors were chosen: Andrzej Stelmachowski, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and 
Andrzej Wielowieyski. These three intellectuals were those who mediated 
between the fledgling Solidarity and the regime in August 1980. One can 
perceive the zeal to turn back time and to transplant a distant event into the 
present. Calling it an anachronism, Skorzynski assessed that “it essentially 
was r. step backwards, a significant setback.”96
If a mobile is assumed to be stable, to follow Latour’s point, the 
rpeaning associated with it has to be shared by its advocates in order to avoid 
distortions. The question then is: Who and what sustained the mobile ‘trade 
union’? It is well known that the aim of relegalising Solidarity at the end of 
the 1980s was not only pursued by the Solidarity elites, as implied in the 
catchword of “revolution from above”. Quite the contrary, it was the 
spontaneous strike waves of young workers in May and August 1988 that 
prepared Solidarity's reemergence from the underground. These strikes were 
staged by young union leaders of the new generation whose first concern was 
expressed in the demands of Inter-enterprise strike committees: trade union 
pluralism and the legalisation of Solidarity.97 Therefore, the absolute 
preference for the relegalisation of Solidarity as a trade union also reflected 
the mood at the broad shop-floor level. Yet, either of the two - the striking 
new generation and the old generation assembled in the civic committee at 
Lech Walçsa98 - conceived of trade union in a different way. This generation 
at a distance, to use Gabriel Tarde’s term, shared the mobile with the new 
generation. However, between the two generations another distance was
95 Skorzynski, Jan (1995), p. 141.
1,6 Skorzynski, Jan (1995), p.68.
91 Holzer, Jerzy/Leski, Krzysztof (1990), p.154.




























































































shaping up. For the new generation, trade union meant, most generally, the 
defense of workers' interests in enterprises and the workplace. The trade 
unionist tendency grew stronger, while the majority of workers did not intend 
to sacrifice their interests and wage demands in the name of an illusory 
political victory." By contrast, for the Solidarity elites around Lech Walfsa 
the revival of the trade union was synonymous to reclaiming its role as the 
only opposition force in Poland.
Common to both currents was the belief in the power of the 'general 
strike', whose potential had been the most powerful instrument of Solidarity 1. 
At the end of the 1980s, however, this instrument had completely vanished.11X1 
Lech Walgsa's speech before the Second National Congress of Solidarity in 
April 1990 was revealing in this respect. Voicing harsh criticism against the 
deviating 'trade-unionist' trade union Solidarity 80, he scorned the strictly 
trade-unionist model of a trade union -espoused by Solidarity 80 - because in 
that case “we must proclaim the general strike immediately.”101 What is more, 
Solidarity's relegalisation after the Round Table was achieved in exchange for 
the recognition of the Law on Trade Unions of 1982. This law virtually made 
strike activity impossible. A further incoherence was the 'protective 
umbrella', by which the first Solidarity government should be given peace on 
the trade union front. It was proposed by Lech Walgsa in autumn 1989 and 
meant suspending Solidarity's strike-action and trade union demands as much 
as possible in order to support the rigid economic programme introduced by 
the Mazowiecki-government. As such, it implied an indirect negation of, and 
opposition to the model of a trade union. In addition, the actual role of 
Solidarity as a trade union in enterprises, as viewed by workers, gives 
account of the fragile stability of this mobile. Furthermore, survey data from 
1991 and 1993 support the weakness of trade unions.102
After its relegalisation in April 1989 and its victory in the June elections 
in June 1989, Solidarity formed a parliamentary representation and came into 
power in autumn 1989. All of a sudden trade-unionist tasks had to be 
combined with parliamentary work and, some months later, with 
governmental responsibility. How was the mobile ‘trade union’ combined in 
view of these different tasks? Although Solidarity did not renounce on its 
organisational core of a trade union, it has lingered so far over a definition of
1)9 Kuczyiiski. Pawel/Nowotny, Stawomir (1994), pp.249/50.
1110 See in particular: Smolar, Aleksander (1989), pp. 16-18.
1111 See: Klimczak, Edward. “Koniec Etosu”, in Poglsjd, May 1990. II National Congress 
of NSZZ Solidarity, p.8.



























































































its identity. The Second National Congress in April 1990 failed in this 
respect, when it declared Solidarity “both a trade union and a social 
movement” which wants to participate “in the transformation of political and 
economic order.” It explicitly rejected the foundation of a political party, but 
did not exclude the “creation of an own trade-unionist representation in 
parliament and in the organs of territorial self-administration.”103 In the 
meantime, Solidarity has spawned more than a dozen political parties or 
movements. This notwithstanding, the union leadership pretended to stick to 
an outstanding political role. Most clamorously it did so in spring 1993, when 
the parliamentary group of the Solidarity union initiated a successful vote of 
non-confidence against the last Solidarity-government of the then prime 
minister Hanna Suchocka. The drop-out of conservative parties from the Sejm 
after the elections of September 1993 has indeed strengthened Solidarity's 
role as a political force. The presidential elections of October 1995 showed a 
revival of the spirit of Solidarity in Polish society. In its wake, the VII 
National Congress in June 1996 decided that “the trade union participates in 
the forthcoming elections to the Sejm and the Senate in the frame of the 
'Election Action Solidarity' (Akcja Wyborcza Solidamosci)w . Thus, seven 
years after 1989, the Solidarity trade union has become the hinge of a broad 
coalition of centre-right parties. Since 1996, opinion polls have ranked the 
‘Solidarity-coalition’ - although it is not a political party- very high in 
preferences with regard to potential elections to the Sejm.H>5
During the underground period, Solidarity was deprived of its central 
trade union attributes. In David Ost's words: “And so, Solidarity's dirty little 
secret: it was not a union at all, it was a myth.”111'’ Starting from its very 
relegalisation up to the present day, Solidarity has claimed to be a trade union 
in defense of workers' interests. Disentangling imitation by the concept of 
action at a distance suggests that Solidarity has never ceased to strive for the 
catch-all aspirations that were associated with the meaning of the Solidarity
11,3 See the programme passed by the II National Congress of 25 April 1990, point I. 4.
1114 Rzeczpospolita, 1 July 1996, p.3. This coalition embraces around 25 smaller and bigger 
political parties of a conservative-nationalist-catholic kind, amongst which there is the 
KPN (Confederation for an Independent Poland) and ZchN (Christian-National Alliance).
1115 At the outset of 1996 the governing SLD (Democratic Left Alliance) still enjoyed a 
considerably higher support in the polls (29-34%) while Solidarity oscillated around 17%, 
see: Rzeczpospolila, 1 April 1996. Since then. Solidarity’s Electoral Action (AWS) has 
caught up (between November 1996 and January 1997: SLD: 28-29%, AWS 27-29%, 
see: Rzeczpospolita, 24 January 1997.




























































































trade union in 1981. In the mid-1990s, its crucial role in Polish politics is 
rather strenghtened by its hazy and undefined competences and ambitions.
So far, one can argue that the unexperienced explorers of 
démocratisation and marketisation in Poland could not learn and implement 
democracy and capitalism separately. Rather, they operationalised the 
mobiles 'trade union' and 'market' as principal objects of imitation. Likewise, 
it has been shown that the translation of the central mobiles in 1989 casts 
doubts about democracy and capitalism as independent logics that would be 
transferred by independent learning process. Their stability depended widely 
on myths and images, either drawn from distant models in the West or from 
distant models in the past. Thus, both market and trade union rather appeared 
as panaceas that wanted to touch upon and resolve any kind of problem. 
Subsequently, it will be outlined which sources nurtured the broad scale of 
meaning associated with the mobiles.
III. The Models of Imitation: the ‘West’ and Solidarity
III. 1. The Image of the West
The convergence of both the communists and the Solidarity elites on the 
main objects, namely the market and its deriving institutional principles, 
allows for the conjecture that there was a common inducement for both. In 
this vein, it was argued that the dissolution and rejection of the communist 
model was followed by “the acceptance of an external image of success and 
creativity: the West.”107 108Ralf Dahrendorf denied such a fixation on the West 
claiming that “the countries of East-Central Europe have not shed their 
communist system in order to embrace the capitalist system - whatever it is. 
They have shed a closed system in order to create an open society.”1011 
However, this argument hardly stands an examination of the coining effect of 
the West on Eastern Europe and seems to be ahistorical.
In his book “Three Europes”, the Hungarian historian Jend Sziics109 
came up with the thesis that Central Europe makes up an in-between stage 
between the West and the East, always prone to imitations of Western models 
because of its (pretended) geographical and socio-cultural closeness. At the 
outset, i.e. from the 9th to the 11th century, the lands of Central Europe 
adopted the Western model as regards the organisation of relations between 
nobelmen and vassals. The late Middle Ages were characterised by particular
107 Thibaud, Paul (1992), p. 112.
108 Dahrendorf, Ralf (1990), p.36.




























































































efforts to join Western civilisation. A unified peasantry, the development of 
towns and cities, the unfolding of a nobility, knight culture and the advent of 
universities nurtured this process. On the other hand, the negative effects of a 
high-numbered nobility, endowed with far-reaching political rights and a 
weak development of towns, and not least the Mongolian raids deepened the 
civilisatory differences between East Central Europe and the West. Thus, the 
unfolding of a civil society after a Western model was hampered. This line of 
thought joins up with Istvan Bibo's divison of Hungary's history into three 
parts. While across the first five hundred years of this millenium Hungary 
shared fundamental roots of social structure with the West, the 16th century 
brought about a split with Western tradition and forced Hungary to develop 
conformable to the Eastern European model. This was the time of a 
“stagnation in the relations of power”, a time of “deadlocks” and hopeless 
trials to return to the Western model. As Bibo saw it, in 1945 there was the 
possiblity to leave the impasse and to jump on the “Western way of societal 
development.”110 Such an assessment squares with Jerzy Szacki's critique of 
the notion “return to Europe” in the Polish context. In his account, while 
communism was responsible for preventing Eastern Europe from catching up 
with the West after the Second World War, it did not cause the split with the 
West.111
In contrast to this reasoning, it was argued that it is “unfounded and 
misleading to describe Soviet societies as the embodiment of 'backwardness' 
as against the West, alias modernity.”112 Yet, not only over the recent history 
of East Central Europe, the West has widely been considered to be superior. 
Moreover, this superiority was constantly named. Thus, in his essay on the 
Bolshevik revolution, Marcel Mauss unmasked the alleged sociological 
Bolshevik 'experiment' as a repetitive and destructive form of imitation in the 
wake of the collapse of the likewise tyrannical Tsarist order.113 A look at 
Lenin's positions shortly after the achieved Bolshevik revolution clearly 
testifies to the superiority of Western capitalist countries and the need to 
imitate them in order to stabilise the newly born Soviet Union.11"1 In this 
respect, it is striking that after the Second World War, the Soviet bloc's self- 
image rejected the option of being Eastern and, rather regarded itself as “the
"° Sziics, Jeno (1994), p.26. Introduction.
111 See: Szacki, Jerzy (1995), p.208.
112 Feher, Ferenc (1995), p.61.
113 Mauss, Marcel (1924-5), p.174.




























































































most developed...Western stage of our civilisation.”" 5 In addition, imitation 
(of the West) persisted as a defining pattern of communism. Its role as 
underpinning the system of the centrally planned economy was stressed by 
Pawel Dembinski who argued that “imitation is one of the classic features of 
the System, and is particularly evident in the economic field.”15 16 *19
The West was both the supposed enemy and the desired destination 
point with which the East wanted to catch up. One can rightly assume, 
following Jeno Szucs's thesis, that the drive towards the West was also 
motivated, perhaps even boosted, by the zeal for becoming detached from the 
East (Soviet Russia). Such an argument explains more profoundly the so- 
called international constraint of Poland. Commonly, it is argued that in 
summer 1989 Solidarity stuck, at least partly, to the Round Table agreements 
because of a potential Soviet menace. At the end of 1989, the shock-therapy 
wanted to establish radical faits accomplis so as to economically distance 
Poland as much as possible from Soviet Russia. In this respect, action at a 
distance was not only targeted by shortening distance (towards the West and 
the Solidarity past) but also to increase the distance to Soviet Russia.
To sum up, there is enough evidence to claim without exaggeration that 
“Westernism, the proclaimed belief in the superiority of the West, was thus 
the final legacy of communism to the societies of Eastern Europe.”" 7 As 
such, “...on the left as on the right, the West is not just a place on the map 
where democracy and industrial capitalism emerged, it is also an empire of 
the mind, imposing belief in an essential form of human society emerging 
from a progressive pattern of history, including the modern tradition of 
revolutionary democracy....” (my italics)"8 With the dissolution of identities, 
values, and institutions in 1989 the power of the image of the West increased, 
signifying both a saving anchor and the promised land. “People yearned for 
Western political institutions, a Western standard of living, Western freedom, 
etc. but not for capitalism...”" 9
III. 2. The Image of Solidarity I
It has been poined out that the introduction of market institutions and the 
reconstitution of the Solidarity trade union, enjoyed a broad support among 
the Solidarity-elites and in Polish society in general. Prior to democratic
115 Feher, Ferenc (1995), p.64.
116 Dembinski, Pawel (1991), p.196.
" ’ Thibaud, Paul (1995), p . l l l .
1,8 Joravsky, David (1994), p.844.




























































































institution-building, the mobile 'trade union' was targeted at the identity- 
features and central aims of Solidarity I. Having claimed that Solidarity as an 
organisation was bruised, stripped of its human potential and of its identity, 
how can it be explained that its image survived?
Despite the complex political situation, the dominant image ruling in 
Solidarity took into account only two forces: 'us' and 'them'. Jadwiga 
Staniszkis argued for the one-dimensionality of Solidarity self-image in 1980 
and 1981 as one of the crucial features of Solidarity's mentality.120 By which 
means was this collective identity carried towards the end of the 1980s? The 
underground situation of Solidarity between 1981 and 1989 entailed the 
virtual suspension of experiences of collective identity. The huge strike 
potential vanished away and the myth of the general strike crumbled. Before 
December 1981 the contrast between we (Solidarity/society) and them 
(communist state) had been constitutive. This dichotomy changed after the 
implementation of martial law. As a survey among workers in Lublin and 
Warsaw during 1983 and 1984 showed, the we-image of we-society, we- 
workers or we-Solidarity evaporated into a broad image of maximum 
generalisation like “we the Poles”.121 The existence of a broad counter-public 
that relied on a number of underground publishers, journals and books could 
be considered to be the “most permanent and most stable structure of the 
underground.”122 Although the lifting of martial law in the mid-1980s opened 
up spaces for a 'parallel culture', the decisive backlash after 1981 was the 
loss of oppositional consciousness on a broad scale of society. As Kaminski 
put it, “because of mild measures instituted during martial law, the fear 
quickly vanished while the humiliation persisted. This was the result of the 
society's perception being forcefully transformed from a subject to object of 
politics.”123
A series of nation-wide polls displayed a considerable drop in the 
number of people who identified themselves as having belonged to Solidarity, 
from 37% in 1981 to 22% in autumn 1985.124 While during 1980 and 1981, 
collective identity of the Solidarity-opposition had been expressed by mass 
protests, strike-actions, and broad activity in enterprises, under martial law 
and also after the general amnesty of 1986 its persistance was rendered 
virtually impossible. While in its heyday, Solidarity had its stronghold in the
1211 Staniszkis, Jadwiga (1984), pp. 145/146.
121 Kuczyriski, Pawe!(1994), p.230.
122 Smolar, Aleksander (1988), p. 19.
123 Kaminski, Barttomicj (1991), p. 137.




























































































big factories, its plant-basis had vanished in 1989. And yet, Solidarity 
managed to raise its rate of approval from less than 25 percent in May 1988 
to over 75 percent in March 1989. In the same time-span the perception of 
Solidarity as an institution beneficial to society rose from 18 to 67 percent.125 
The elections in June 1989 amounted to an anti-communist referendum, 
elevating the Solidarity-opposition to the height of public approval.
How did the “monolithic collective subject”, as labelled by Szacki, 
translate into the situation of 1988 and 1989? How could the myth of unity be 
nourished and, finally, be reactivated? To understand this properly, a look at 
the social pillars that formed Solidarity, is needed. In the following the 
connection between individuals and the collective subject shall be examined 
by taking recourse to Norbert Elias and to Max Weber. Elias claimed that 
“habitus and identification, being related to group membership, are always - 
in the modern world where people belong to groups within groups - multi­
layered.”126 Following on that, one can claim that “individual self-images and 
group we-images are not separate things. Or, as Elias put it, “the individual 
bears in himself or herself the habitus of the group, and..., it is this habitus 
that he or she individualises to a greater or lesser extent.”127 Hence, processes 
of habitus- and identity-formation over long periods must be seen by 
“changes in the We-I balance.”128 129
The works on Solidarity by Roman Laba and Lawrence Goodwyn 
regarded Solidarity as rooted in a socio-economic class. This class was seen 
as mainly formed by workers. However, the concept of class is hardly 
applicable to a communist system. First, because economic criteria that 
usually account for class cleavages were insignificant. Second, because 
Solidarity was much too heterogenous an organisation to clearly make 
distinctions other than between generalised social groups, like workers, 
intellegentsia, farmers. Thus, Rubik tried to revise Laba's and Goodwyn's 
assumptions by denoting Solidarity an outcome of a cultural-political class. 
According to him, “This cultural political class was made up not of workers 
or intellectuals but of all those who subscribed to a system of principles and 
values,...,who visualized the social structure as strongly polarized between 
'us' (society, people) and 'them' (authorities, communists).126 Moreover,
125 See the data in Mason, David/Nelson, Daniel/Szklarski, Bohdan (1991), pp.209/210.
I2f’ Mennell, Stephen (1992), p. 177.
127 Elias, Norbert (1991) The Sociology of Individuals, p. 182/183.
,2K See: Mennell, Stephen (1992), p.194.




























































































taking the cue from Max Weber, Kubik and Staniszkis refer to “Solidarity” as 
a status (or cultural) group.110
The definition proposed by Kubik is - although pointing into the right 
direction - not entirely to the point. The crucial passage in Weber says: 
“Inhaltlich findet die standische Ehre ihren Ausdruck normalerweise vor 
allem in der Zumutung einer spezifisch gearteten Lebensjuhrung an jeden, 
der dem Kreise angehoren will”....”Sobald nicht eine blofi individuelle und 
sozial irrelevante Nachahmung fremder Lebensjuhrung, sondern ein 
einverstandliches Gemeinschaftshandeln dieses Charakters vorliegt, ist die 
'standische ' Entwicklung im Gang.”'3' In Weber's definition, Stand'32 is 
determined by social estimation of honour. Life conduct (Lebensjuhrung) 
played a crucial role during the legal activities of Solidarity, but it grew in 
importance in the underground. This should be briefly illustrated. First, the 
Underground-Solidarity stuck to its ethic of non-violence. Despite some 
temptation to strike back against martial law by violent action’33, this was 
clearly rejected by the underground-leader Zbigniew Bujak. The most 
significant symbol of the self-limiting opposition in the underground was 
perhaps the award of the peace Nobel prize for Lech Walesa in 1983. 
Second, a central experience of martial law was the arrest of Solidarity 
activists and its leaders.130 *234 135 Virtually all central figures that played an 
important role in 1980/81 and would resume a leading position in 1988/1989 
served a sentence of several years.133 Third, the Catholic Church as the focal 
point of an oppositional life-conduct acquired crucial importance. While the 
Church had been an ally of Solidarity before martial law was proclaimed, it 
became its shelter in the underground. The manifestation of oppositional 
Ptbos was t0 a large extent limited to the safeguard of the Church. Thus, 
individual profession of sharing common, collective values was promoted.
130 Kubik, Jan (1994), p.447, see also: Staniszkis, Jadwiga (1984), p.146.
91 W?ber, Max (1980), p. 535.
132 To avoid misunderstandings, especially frequent with the English term “status”, I keep 
9P qsing the German original.
1,3 See Jacek Kuroh’s pamphlet of 1982 whose significance he reassessed in Kuroii, 
Jacek/Zakowski, Jacek (1995).
134 When martial law was proclaimed, 425 persons were arrested. Of the 107 members of 
Solidarity's National commission almost all were arrested, with the exception of Bujak, 
Kosmowski, Frasyniuk and Janas. During 1982 3616 persons were arrested, of which at 
the outset of 1983 still 1500 were in jail. These data draw on information provided by 
Holzer, Jerzy/Leski, Krzysztof (1990), p.9 and 65 and Staniszkis, Jadwiga (1984), p.319 
Anm. 3.




























































































During the two visits of Pope John Paul II. to Poland in 1983 and 1987, 
Solidarity displayed its presence and was able to keep alive its symbolic 
repertory, the relics of Solidarity.136 Moreover, the Church's tutelary function 
extended from religious welfare for workers to the provision of places for 
seminars, lectures and sales of underground-publications.
Let us finally come back to Elias's claim for a change in the we-I 
balance. By the concept of life-conduct one can show how Solidarity survived 
as a we-image, although it had lost its organisational features and the means 
that had formally made up Solidarity’s collective identity. Accordingly, the 
we-image was preserved, by the shift of identity-preserving life-conduct to 
the individual level. It was the I-image - dispersed among individuals sticking 
to Solidarity-ideals in their life-conduct - that accounted for the survival of 
Solidarity. The link between individual destiny and collective identity was 
clearly expressed by Adam Michnik, whose letter to General Kiszczak - 
responsible for the implementation of martial law - said: “For me General, 
prison is not such a painful punishment. On that December night it was not I 
who was condemned but freedom: it is not I who am being held prisoner but 
Poland.”137 The individual I-image, formed and maintained by the leaders of 
Solidarity remained the guarantors of the preservation of Solidarity's 
suspended we-image.
III. 3. Action at a Distance in 1989- The Identification with Distant 
Images
What are the consequences of these findings for the unfolding of 
democracy and capitalism in Poland? By applying Latour’s concept of action 
at a distance, it was asked whether the logics of democracy and capitalism 
were transferred as stable and combinable mobiles. The translation of 
knowledge hinges, in Latour’s terms, on the fate of two actors or forces 
bound up with one another. In fact, the fate of East and West in 1989 was 
bound together by the drive to translate the logics of democracy and 
capitalism from the West (and from the past) to the East. However, as argued 
in this paper, 1989 did not initiate a learning process of institutional ties and 
processes which would have introduced independent logics of democracy and
136 Smolar, Aleksander (1988), p.31 “Uniibersehbar ist die symbolische Prdsenz der 
Gewerkschaftsbewegung: die Reliquien' der 'Solidarnosc’', die Erinnerungstafeln, 
Fahnen und Losungen, die lypischen Schriftziige, die Blumenkreuze und stilisierten 
Weihnachlskrippen als Symbole des Leidens, des Todes und der erwarteien Auferstehung 
der 'Solidarnosc'".




























































































capitalism. Above all, 1989 was about the quick shortening of distance by 
identification with images.
How influence of any sort can be effective over a distance, was already 
thematised by Max Weber in his Sociology of Religion. Traditionally, the 
quality of local deities did not lead to monotheism, but rather reinforced 
religious particularism. On the contrary, the Jewish Yahweh evolved as the 
universal and omnipotent God, given his specificity as a God that ruled “as a 
God from afar” (aus der Feme) and who approached “only when the military 
need of his people required his presence and participation.”138 It is this 
“effective influence from afar” (Fernwirkung) which presumably was a factor 
that partook in the evolution of the concept of Yahweh as the universal and 
omnipotent God. Such a relationship towards a worshiped divinity can be 
detected also in Eastern Europe. In Joravsky’s terms this is the case, “...when 
the highest officials of the chief communist system adopted the dissident 
accusation and started the radical reforms, only to suffer a collapse of 
ideological self-confidence and conversion to a new dream of a utopian leap 
out of history, this time through worship of “the market”.I3g The ‘market’ 
was, as shown in this paper, ‘elsewhere’ in the West.
This comes close to what Adam Przeworski termed the ‘Eastern 
European syllogism’. Its major premise holds that “if it were not for 
communism, we would have been like the West”, while the minor premise is 
“Now communism is gone”. The conclusion not only asserts that Eastern 
Europe should and will now embrace a Western-style economy but also 
promises that this economy will generate the glitter and glamour of developed 
capitalism.”140 In this vein, a literal swamp of images of the West invaded 
Poland in the early 1970s.141 Gierek’s attempt to build a ‘second Poland’ was 
heralded by a massive visualisation of Western goods and travel sites. The 
function of West-Berlin as the show-case of the West is a telling metaphor in 
this respect. Its entirely positive connotations mediated a wonderful image of 
the future in the arms of the West.
Similarly, two important events in 1988 and 1989 illustrate the power of 
images. First, when the preparatory talks for the Round Table negotiations 
seemed to be in a deadlock, the television debate between OPZZ-chairman 
Alfred Miodowicz and Solidarity chairman Lech Walfsa changed things
l5K Weber, Max (1980), p.254.
IM Joravsky, David (1994), p.848.
1411 See: Przeworski, Adam (1993), p. 141.




























































































entirely. To see the mythical leader of Solidarity on TV screens literally 
revived the image of Solidarity I and pulled it closer from a distant but not 
forgotten past, “...for the first time a mass of spectators could hear and see 
the chairman of the subversive underground organisation - until not long ago a 
10-million people trade union - which for the huge majority was nothing but a 
distant rememberance.”142 The semi-free elections in June 1989 proved for a 
second time the importance of the image of the charismatic Solidarity leader. 
Every candidate running for Solidarity under the auspices of the civic 
committees made a photo with Walçsa that was diffused on thousands of 
posters across the country. “...Walçsa, next to the symbol of Solidarity 
became our sign of identification.”143 It seems to be only conclusive that the 
only Solidarity candidate not to be elected had not made a photo together 
with Walçsa.144
The foregoing analysis has shown that imitation of democracy and 
capitalism in pre- and post-1989 Poland reveals a distorted cycle of 
accumulation of knowledge. Marketisation and démocratisation were 
embodied by the mobiles ‘market’ and ‘ trade union’. These mobiles were not 
stable, they represented all-encompassing images based on persistent myths. 
As a consequence, their combinability became boundless. Bearing on the 
foregoing considerations, the universalising project of the West, in Feher’s 
argument, did not follow the lines of two independent logics. By aspiring at 
the whole of the image of the West (and the image of Solidarity), the acutal 
object was lost out of sight.
The image West exerted an overall and undifferentiated attraction. 
Capitalism was synonymous to 'non-socialism', thus boiling down to the 
West. Therefore, “into the bag called 'capitalist world' simultaneously were 
crammed Switzerland and Sweden, as well as Haiti, Iran and Madagaskar. 
Capitalist were both 18th century England and present Germany.”145 If such 
an approach is, as Zielinski asserts, a popular simplification and a 
fundamental error, then this only underlines its widespread usage and the 
significance of the undifferentiated image. Because of constraints of time and 
transferability but also due to bruised identities, political and social learning 
was suspended and replaced by identifications with images. Elemér Hankiss
142 Skorzyriski, Jan (1995), p. 133.
14:' Kuroii, Jacek/Zakowski, Jacek (1995), p.269.
144 Kurori, Jacek/Zakowski, Jacek (1995), p.269.




























































































put it perhaps most clearly: “the West shone in the distance, the light of hope 
in a world of defeat and despair.”146
Similarly, the image of Solidarity I ruled the ‘démocratisation’ by and in 
Solidarity. An assessment of the immediate post 1989 period by Adam 
Michnik is illuminating: “Solidarity continually lived at this time by the myth 
of its power. It wanted to take over power everywhere, where it was possible, 
wanted to dictate the government personnel politics....One thing the leaders of 
Solidarity did not want to do: to reflect upon, which should be the formula of 
0 (rade union in a democratic state of law in an epoch of transformation to 
the market.” (my italics)147 In 1990 people began to ask themselves: “How is 
|t that Solidarity can at the same time be the government, a trade union, the 
patjon, me?”14* Solidarity II was everything because it identified itself with 
Solidarity I. At the end of the 1980s, “the world was different,..., Poland was 
different, and Solidarity wanted to be the same."{my italics)149
(n 1989, Poland’s objective was to tighten bonds with images 
(W§st/Solidarity) to which it inherently belonged, but of which it had been 
deprived or alienated by geographical, mental, and temporal distances. As 
such, potion at a distance stands for the reversal of alienation, namely the 
Identification with something. Karl Mannheim described “social 
'djs|antjation' as “akin to, but not identical with, 'alienation'. The latter 
consists in the cooling off of emotional relationships. When we become 
'pljenated' from someone, we undo ties of identification that formerly had 
bound us together. Similarly, we may become 'alienated' from places or 
gfOUgs in which we had once felt at home.”150 Taking the cue from 
Mannheim, Poland was never really alienated from democracy and capitalism 
PS systems of practices and behaviour. The familiarity with market and 
democratic institutions was, at best, ephimeral. Poland was rather alienated 
from the source of these supposed models and potential benefits, the West. 
“Thg ongoing delegitimation of the Soviet model entailed the growing 
identification with the West as a counter-model.”151 And it was alienated 
from the spirit of Solidarity which in 1980 achieved the ‘subjectivisation’ of 
Polish society. “The identification with Solidarity led to a loss of distance
146 Hapkiss, Elemér (1994), p.l 18.
147 Michnik, Adam (1995), p.341.
I4tl Kolarska-Bobiiiska, Lena (1994), p.68.
I4!) Michnik, AdamATischner, Jozef/Zakowski, Jacek (1995), p.572.
150 Mannheim, Karl (1992), p.207.




























































































towards it.”(my italics)152 Thus in 1989, Poland did not learn the logics of 
democracy and capitalism, but it imitated the image of the West and of 
Solidarity I.
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